The name, image, and likeness (NIL) era has transformed more than compensation. It has reframed eligibility as an economic right — and that shift is driving a new wave of litigation against the NCAA.
Recent cases involving quarterbacks Diego Pavia, Trinidad Chambliss, and Joey Aguilar illustrate both the growing pressure on NCAA eligibility rules and the doctrinal fault lines that determine who obtains emergency relief — and who does not.
The Strategic Split: Aguilar Leaves Federal Court
Joey Aguilar’s challenge to the NCAA’s rule counting junior college seasons toward the four-year Division I eligibility limit did not begin in isolation. Aguilar was initially aligned with the federal antitrust litigation brought by Vanderbilt quarterback Diego Pavia.[1]
Aguilar later withdrew and filed his own action in Tennessee state court, challenging the “JUCO” rule under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act (TTPA) and state NIL statute, reportedly seeking a faster, individualized resolution ahead of the upcoming season.[2] He initially secured a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of the eligibility rule.[3]
However, when the court considered whether to issue a preliminary injunction — which would have preserved his ability to compete while litigation proceeded — the judge denied relief, finding Aguilar had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits and emphasizing broader governance concerns.[4]
The result: no injunction, and no immediate eligibility.
Why Pavia Prevailed
In contrast, Diego Pavia obtained preliminary injunctive relief in federal court.
Pavia’s claim was grounded in federal antitrust law, arguing that counting JUCO seasons toward Division I eligibility constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade — particularly in the NIL marketplace where eligibility correlates directly to economic opportunity.[1]
Two structural features likely contributed:
- Federal Forum + Antitrust Framing
Federal courts applying modern antitrust doctrine post-Alston have demonstrated increased willingness to scrutinize NCAA restraints. See NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021).[5] - Likelihood of Success Showing
The federal court was persuaded Pavia raised sufficiently serious questions on the merits to justify maintaining the status quo.[1]
As with most emergency relief in NCAA-eligibility litigation, the injunction did not resolve the ultimate legality of the rule — but it functionally preserved a season of eligibility.
Why Chambliss Succeeded
Trinidad Chambliss won under a different theory. Rather than advancing a broad antitrust challenge, Chambliss used principles of contract law to contest the NCAA’s denial of a medical hardship waiver in Mississippi state court, alleging the NCAA failed to apply its bylaws in good faith when it improperly handled his waiver request.[6]
The court granted preliminary relief, reportedly crediting concerns regarding the fairness and consistency of the waiver process.[6]
Chambliss’s case demonstrates that courts may be more receptive where the claim centers on alleged procedural irregularities or bad faith in rule application, rather than a structural challenge to eligibility limits themselves.
Why Aguilar Didn’t
The court ruled against Aguilar because he failed to show a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of his TTPA claim, which the court treated as “typically determinative” for injunctive relief.[7] Specifically, he did not prove that the NCAA “JUCO” rule has a “substantial effect” on Tennessee trade or commerce as required under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s limiting construction of the TTPA. The court found that Aguilar’s evidence showed mainly his own lost NIL income, with no causal proof of broader effects on Tennessee’s economy or consumers.[8] The court also held that the conduct at issue substantially affects interstate commerce and that, under Tennessee precedent and the U.S. Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause, the TTPA cannot be applied to regulate the NCAA’s nationwide eligibility rules in the way Aguilar requested.[9] Even assuming a federal-style “rule of reason” applied, the court found Aguilar’s antitrust proof deficient and concluded that “the evidence before the Court at this time only demonstrates that the Plaintiff has a low likelihood to succeed on the merits of his claim.”[10]
Separately, the court rejected Aguilar’s reliance on Tennessee’s NIL statute because it does not create a private cause of action or authorize private injunctive relief, reserving enforcement to the Attorney General.[11]
On the other factors, while the court agreed that Aguilar faced irreparable harm by losing a year of eligibility and significant NIL opportunities, it found the balance of harms only equal at best and the public-interest factor neutral.[12]
With irreparable harm favoring Aguilar but a low likelihood of success on the merits and constitutional limits on the statutes he invoked, the court dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied his motion for a temporary injunction.[13]
Where Pavia’s federal court was persuaded to preserve the athlete’s status quo under antitrust principles, Aguilar’s state court was less willing to intervene at the preliminary stage.
The divergence underscores a recurring theme in NIL-era litigation: forum and framing can be outcome determinative.
The Post-Alston Eligibility Battlefield
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alston marked a doctrinal shift. Although the case addressed education-related benefits, its broader reasoning rejected expansive judicial deference to NCAA amateurism rationales and reaffirmed that NCAA rules are subject to ordinary antitrust scrutiny.[5]
Since then, litigants have increasingly reframed eligibility restrictions as economic restraints affecting NIL compensation.
Pavia and Chambliss secured preliminary relief because their courts were persuaded — under distinct doctrinal pathways — that intervention was warranted at the outset. Aguilar, despite initially aligning with Pavia’s federal strategy, pursued a state-court route relying on Tennessee state antitrust law that ultimately failed to satisfy the demanding preliminary injunction standard.
Whether counting JUCO seasons toward Division I eligibility can withstand sustained antitrust scrutiny remains unresolved. It also remains to be seen whether student athletes will find sustained success challenging the NCAA’s waiver denials under principles of contract law. Until appellate courts provide clarity, eligibility will remain one of the most dynamic — and strategically sensitive — battlegrounds of the NIL revolution.
In fact, the next high-profile eligibility challenge is underway. A preliminary injunction hearing was just set for early April to determine whether University of Virginia Quarterback Chandler Morris will be eligible for a seventh year of college football.[14] In making a similar argument as Chambliss, Morris contends the 26 snaps he played over three appearances in 2022 were part of a medically prescribed mental health treatment plan and that the NCAA disregarded mental health documentation submitted by Virginia on Morris’ behalf in denying his eligibility waiver.[15]
Footnotes
[1] See Mark Schlabach, “Vanderbilt QB Diego Pavia suing NCAA over eligibility rules” ESPN (2024), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/42286584/vanderbilt-qb-diego-pavia-suing-ncaa-eligibility-rules.
[2] Adam Sparks, “Joey Aguilar’s future with Tennessee left for judge to decide after hearing” Knoxville News Sentinel (2026), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/sports/college/university-of-tennessee/football/2026/02/13/joey-aguilar-eligibility-tennessee-football-ncaa-lawsuit/88518530007/.
[3] “TRO granted for Vols QB Aguilar in bid for extra eligibility” ESPN (Feb. 4, 2026), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/47826551/tro-granted-vols-qb-aguilar-bid-extra-eligibility.
[4] Mark Schlabach, “Judge denies Tennessee QB Joey Aguilar eligibility bid,” ESPN (Feb. 20, 2026), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/47989435/judge-denies-tennessee-qb-joey-aguilar-eligibility-bid.
[5] See generally NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021).
[6] Pete Thamel “Ole Miss QB Trinidad Chambliss granted injunction in eligibility dispute” ESPN (Feb. 12, 2026), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/47912898/ole-miss-qb-trinidad-chambliss-granted-injunction-judge.
[7] Memorandum and Opinion, and Order, Jose “Joey” Aguilar v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 212611-3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Knox Cnty. Feb. 20, 2026) (“Op.”) at 10, 26-27.
[8] Op. at 21–23, 26.
[9] Op. at 23–26.
[10] Op. at 26–27.
[11] Op. at 18–19 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 49‑7‑2803).
[12] Op. at 9–10, 27.
[13] Op. at 26–28.
[14] Greg Madia, “Hearing Set for Virginia QB Chandler Morris’ Lawsuit Against the NCAA” Daily News-Record (Mar. 6, 2026), https://www.dnronline.com/sports/level/college/hearing-set-for-virginia-qb-chandler-morris-lawsuit-against-the-ncaa/article_8a08af02-f4eb-5ae3-a25d-f5c054328884.html.
[15] Max Olsen, “Virginia QB Chandler Morris Files Lawsuit Seeking 7th Year” ESPN (Feb. 24, 2026), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/48026183/virginia-qb-chandler-morris-files-lawsuit-seeking-7th-year.